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Previous research regarding the reaction of the Canadian public to women's 
increased labour force participation during World War II (WWII) has emphasized public 
opposition to the participation of women in the armed forces and in war-related industry. 
In contrast, the present analysis of public opinion regarding women's labour force 
participation both in and out of uniform indicates ( i) widespread public recognition of the 
need for women in the armed forces and in war industries; and (ii) popular support for, 
and endorsement of, policy initiatives designed to secure female labour to meet Canada's 
civil and military commitments. By emphasizing the positive side of public opinion, the 
findings argue for a more balanced interpretation of the historical evidence regarding 
public response to women's wartime labour force participation. 
Les recherches anterieures au sujet des reactions du public canadien face a 
/' accroissement des effectifs feminins au sein de Ia population active au cours de La 
Seconde Guerre mondiale ont souligne /'opposition populaire a/' emploi des femmes dans 
les forces armies et dans les industries de guerre. Par ailleurs, les etudes recentes sur 
/'opinion publique relative a La presence des femmes au sein des forces armees-qu' elles 
portent ou non /'uniforme- et des industries de guerre indiquent (i) que La grande 
majorite /' estime necessaire et (ii) qu' elle appuie sans reserve La politique de recrutement 
des femmes pour permettre au Canada d' honorer ses engagements en matieres civiles et 
militaires. Ces constatations incitent a une interpretation mieu.x equilibree des donnees 
historiques concernant les reactions du grand public a /'integration des femmes dans La 
main-d' lEuvre en temps de guerre. 
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I - Introduction 
World War II (WWII) witnessed unprecedented demands for 
"womanpower" both in the armed forces and in war-related industry. 1 Two 
issues are central to the analysis of the reaction of the Canadian public to these 
demands: (1) public recognition of the need for "womanpower" both in and 
out of uniform; and (2) the extent to which public opinion endorsed and/or 
supported government initiatives designed to secure female labour to meet the 
nation's civil and military commitments. 
Several studies have addressed the issue of public response to women's 
increased labour force participation during WWie This research has tended 
to emphasize public opposition to the participation of women in the armed 
forces and in non-traditional war industries. Such opposition is analyzed in 
terms of Canadians' commitment to traditional attitudes toward woman's 
"feminine" nature and her proper sphere in Canadian society. 
The present analysis does not negate the existence of public opposition 
to women's recruitment into the women's services of the armed forces and 
civilian war industries. By emphasizing the positive side of public opinion, it 
does, however, argue for a more balanced interpretation of the historical 
evidence regarding the public reaction. The analysis demonstrates that, despite 
any economic and ideological inconsistencies between wartime 
"womanpower" requirements and traditional attitudes toward women's role in 
Canadian society, public opinion indicated widespread support for women in 
both the armed forces and in war-related industry. Public endorsement of 
Canadian women's uniformed and civilian wartime service was based on a 
recognition by the majority of the Canadian population of the necessity of 
female labour for the successful prosecution of the war. While such popular 
support may have, at times, conflicted with traditional attitudes regarding 
women's place in Canadian society, women's civilian and uniformed service 
was deemed a "necessary sacrifice forthe nation at war". 
1. Ruth Roach Pierson, "Women's Emancipation and the Recruitment of Women into 
the Labour Force in World War II" in Susan Mann Trofirnenkoff and Alison Prentice, eds., The 
Neglected Majority: Essays in Canadian Women's History. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1977, pp. 125-145. 
2. Ruth Roach Pierson, "Ladies or Loose Women: The Canadian Women's Army 
Corps in World War II", Atlantis: A Women's Studies Journal, IV, 2, Spring 1979-part II, 
CRIAW Issue, pp. 245-266; Ruth Roach Pierson, "They're Still Women After All": The Second 
World War and Canadian Womanhood. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986; R.E. Park, 
"Public Opinion and the Placement of Canadian Forces' Servicewomen in Combat", paper 
presented at the 20th International Applied Military Psychology Symposium, Brussels, 
Belgium, June 25-29, 1984. 
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11-Data 
Data regarding public opinion3 toward the expansion of employment 
opportunities for women during WWII were obtained from responses to polls 
conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) (The Gallup 
Poll) from 1942 to 1945 published in the Toronto Star. 4 Additional information 
regarding public attitudes toward women's enlistment in the armed forces (and 
in war industries) was obtained from a survey conducted by Elliott-Haynes 
Limited, a Montreal-based independent commercial research agency, on be-
half of The Advertising Agencies of Canada and the · Joint Committee on 
Combined Recruiting Promotion, Women's Services of the Three Armed 
Forces. The results of this survey were published in 1943 in a report entitled 
An Enquiry into The Attitudes of the Canadian Civilian Public Towards the 
Women's Armed Forces. 5 The purpose of this survey was to "ascertain from 
the civilian public the reasons why more eligible women of Canada are not 
offering themselves for enlistment into the three armed forces."6 Specifically, 
the survey "aimed to determine: (a) public consciousness of need of women 
3. The meaning of the term "public opinion" had been widely debated in the literature 
since the late 1930s. Floyd H. Allport, in the inaugural issue of The Public Opinion Quarterly, 
attempted to bring order out of the conceptual chaos by surveying the literature of the field and 
specifying several fallacious notions that had given rise to misconceptions. He contributed this 
definition: "The term public opinion is given its meaning with reference to a multi-individual 
situation in which individuals are expressing themselves, or can be called upon to express 
themselves, as favouring (or else disfavouring or opposing) some definite condition, person, or 
proposal of widespread importance in such a proportion of number, intensity and constancy as 
to give rise to the probability of affecting action, directly or indirectly, toward the object 
concerned" (Floyd H. Allport, "Toward a Science of Public Opinion", The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, vol. 1, n° 1, January, 1937, p. 23). Subsequent attempts to clarify the meaning of 
"public opinion" suggested that the term "public opinion" referred to "any collection of 
individual opinions designated" (Harwood L. Childs, "By Public Opinion, I Mean", The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, vol. 3, n° 2, April, 1939, p. 331. Lucien Warner offered a similar definition 
arguing that public opinion referred to "the sum total of all individual opinions" and that "tacitly, 
public opinion usually is meant to refer to the voting public" (Warner, "The Reliability of Public 
Opinion Surveys", The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 3, n° 3, July, 1939, pp. 377-388. Gallup 
and Rae suggested that "public opinion is compounded of the opinions of individuals in all 
walks of life". Implicit here is the notion of "adulthood" and, by inference; Warner's tacit 
assumption of "the voting public" (George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, The Pulse of Democ-
racy: The Public Opinion Poll and How It Works. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 
p. 245). The Elliott-Haynes Report used the term "public opinion" specifically to refer to the 
opinions of the "Canadian adult civilian population" (Elliott-Haynes Report, p. 3). Again, the 
tacit assumption of "voting public" is implied. For a review of the formation, measurement and 
impact of public opinion, see Susan Welch and John Comer, eds., Public Opinion. Palo Alto, 
California: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1975. 
4. The polls of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) were not available 
from the Institute for Social Research, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, 
M3J 1P3, prior to May 1945. CIPO results reported here were obtained from selected issues of 
the Toronto Star. 
5. Elliott-Haynes Limited, An Enquiry into the Attitudes of the Canadian Civilian 
Public Towards the Women's Armed Forces. Montreal and Toronto, 1943. 
6. Ibid., p. 3. 
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in the armed forces; (b) factors which the public felt would influence women 
to join the armed forces; and (c) factors which the public felt would influence 
women to avoid joining the armed forces. "7 The study claimed to have 
randomly surveyed the opinions of "7 ,283 civilian adults"8 from "56 Canadian 
centres and their surrounding areas" and to have "covered both sexes, all races, 
all geographical regions, all age levels, all economic levels, all occupations 
and all classes of conjugal condition"9 of the Canadian adult civilian popula-
tion. 
A second study, prepared and conducted by the Directorate of Army 
Recruiting in collaboration with the Joint Committee on Combined Recruiting 
Promotion, Women's Services of the Three Armed Forces, surveyed attitudes 
of members of the Canadian Women's Army Corps (CWAC) toward uni-
formed service. The confidential report of this inquiry entitled Canadian 
Women's Army Corps: Why Women Join and How They Like It was available 
for limited distribution in July 1943.10 
In addition to the quantitative data, a survey of the Toronto Star (daily 
edition), from September 1939 to December 1945, provided important quali-
tative data regarding public reaction toward the rapid expansion of employ-
ment opportunities for women in the Canadian labour force. 
III - Public opinion 
The present analysis addcesses two questions central to our understand-
ing of public reaction to the participation of Canadian women in the armed 
forces and in war-related industry. First, to what extent did public opinion 
reflect Canadians' cognizance of the "need" for female labour both in and out 
of -uniform? Second, to what extent did the attitudes of the adult civilian 
population reflect public endorsement of support for government initiatives 
designed to secure female labour to meet the civil and military commitments 
necessary for the successful prosecution of the war? 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid.: respondents were selected by "random sample technique" and opinions 
obtained by means of "personal interviews conducted in the home by trained investigators who 
administered a questionnaire". Warner, "The Reliability of Public Opinion Surveys", 1939: The 
"new random sampling techniques" had been introduced to the field of public opinion polling 
in the wake of the inability of U.S. polls to accurately predict the outcome of the 1936 
presidential election. By the 1940s, random sampling techniques were an integral part of public 
opinion survey methods. There would appear to be no reason, therefore, to suspect that the 
claims of randomness reported here were not legitimate. 
9. Ibid.: responses to the survey questions were broken down by sex, geographic 
regions, occupational groupings (e.g., war workers, civilian workers, farm workers), type of 
persons (e.g., parents, young men, young women) and national representation groups (e.g., 
Anglophone, Francophone). 
10. Directorate of Army Recruiting, Canadian Women's Army Corps: Why Women 
Join and How They Like It. Ottawa: Directorate of History, Department of National Defence, 
April-May, 1943, 113.3A 2009 (01). 
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Previous research has focussed on the perceived need to overcome the 
substaritial opposition to women's uniformed service, which the Elliott-
Haynes survey of public opinion and the investigation of CWAC opinion 
revealed. 11 Ruth Roach Pierson bases her analysis of public opinion upon two 
items contained in the 1943 public opinion survey. These items reveal both the 
low priority accorded women's uniformed service as a way for women to 
contribute to the successful prosecution of the war and the "widespread 
disapproval" among friends and relatives of young eligible women to their 
enlistment in the armed forces. The adverse impact of such disapproval on 
recruitment into the women's services was evident in the survey of CWAC 
• • 12 
op1mon. 
A re-examination of these items, however, suggests that Pierson may 
have overstated public opposition to women's recruitment into the armed 
forces. One factor which may have resulted in a more negative interpretation 
of the data than may be warranted concerns conclusions drawn in the CWAC 
Report that could be seen to be derived from rather dubious methodological 
procedures. One item contained in the Elliott-Haynes survey upon which 
Pierson bases her analysis focussed on the extent to which parents, husbands, 
boyfriends and brothers approved of female friends and relatives joining the 
armed forces. Forty-three percent of those surveyed approved of their "daugh-
ters, wives, girlfriends and sisters" joining the armed forces, 39 percent dis-
approved, and 18 percent did not know. 13 Clearly, friends and relatives' 
approval/disapproval of young eligible women joining the armed forces was 
divided. Pierson, however, interprets the extraneous "don't know" category as 
"indifference or neutrality", concluding that "a more negative construction 
could be put on the data."14 Such an interpretation was evident in the CWAC 
Report: "When pressed with the question, 57 percent of the public stated that 
they would not give open approval to their friends and relatives enrolling in 
the women's forces.".s Interestingly, however, the Elliott-Haynes survey, upon 
which this item is based, drew no such negative conclusion. If extraneous 
categories are to be used to support a particular ideological position, a more 
positive construction might just as easily be put on the data. Thus, we might 
conclude that 61 percent would not openly disapprove of friends and relatives 
joining the forces. But clearly, this is not the rationale underlying inclusion of 
extraneous categories in survey research. On the basis of responses to this 
item, the only appropriate interpretation that can be given to the data is that 
parents, male friends and relatives were divided in the extent to which they 
approved of their female friends and relatives joining the forces. 
11. Ruth Roach Pierson, "Ladies or Loose Women", pp. 247-248; "They're Still 
Women .. . ",pp. 135-137. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Elliott-Haynes, p. 12. 
14. Ruth Roach Pierson, "They're Still Women ... ", p. 136. 
15. CWAC Report, p. 28, cited in Pierson, "They're Still Women .. . ", p. 136. 
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Moreover, if we exclude the responses of French-speaking Canadians, 
we find that the majority of English-speaking Canadians (52 percent) ap-
proved of female friends and relatives' enlistment in the armed forces. 16 The 
greater resistance among Francophones to women's uniformed services is 
reflected in the fact that only 22 percent of respondents approved of the 
enlistment of female friends and relatives in the armed forces. While no doubt, 
adherence to traditional attitudes toward femininity and women's proper 
sphere in Canadian society influenced Francophone (and Anglophone) atti-
tudes toward women's labour force participation during WWII, the greater 
opposition to women's uniformed services evident among French-speaking 
Canadians here may be seen as part of a more general rejection of government 
defence policies and initiatives. For example, results of an April 27, 1942 
plebiscite on conscription of men for overseas service indicated that 
72 percent of adults in the Province of Quebec were opposed to such a 
measure, while only 28 percent voted in favour of conscription.17 Comparable 
figures for the other eight provinces indicated that 80 percent of Canadians 
voted in favour of the conscription issue, while 20 percent rejected compul-
sory overseas service for Canadian men. Figures for the nation as a whole 
similarly indicated that the majority (64 percent) of Canadians supported a 
wartime policy of conscription for overseas service, while 36 percent voted 
against the conscription issue. 18 
Locating the discussion of Francophone reaction to women's military 
participation within the broader historical context argues against a simplistic 
division of French Canadians' . attitudes into "woman power" requirements 
versus "maintaining homelife". A more holistic interpretation of the historical 
evidence which places the analysis of Francophone response to women's 
uniformed and civilian wartime service within the broader political, economic 
and social context is required. 
A second item, contained in the Elliott-Haynes survey and upon which 
Pierson bases her analysis of public opposition to women's enlistment in the 
armed forces, is the question "How can women best serve Canada's war 
effort?" Seven percent of the civilian public answered "joining the women's 
forces." 19 Five other categories took precedence. "Maintaining home life" 
ranked first in importance (26 percent); followed by "doing war work in 
factories" (23 percent); "part-time voluntary relief work" (13 percent); 
"conserving food, rationing" (11 percent); and "buying war bonds, stamps" 
16. Elliott-Haynes, p. 13. 
17. Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century. Toronto: The MacMillan Company of 
Canada Ltd., 1970, p. 256. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Elliott-Haynes, p. 8. 
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(8 percent).20 Pierson argues that since "part-time voluntary relief work", 
"conserving food, rationing" and "buying war bonds, stamps" were all com-
patible with "maintaining home life", "the inescapable conclusion is that an 
overwhelming majority of Canadians, in 1942, saw women's place to be in the 
home, wartime or not."21 This conclusion, however, raises an important 
conceptual and analytical problem related to the implicit assumption that 
categories considered to be compatible with "maintaining home life" were 
necessarily incompatible with other less-traditional wartime contributions. 
There is no evidence, however, to suggest that "doing war work in factories" 
and "buying war bonds, stamps", or "conserving food, rationing" constituted 
mutually exclusive categories. The construction of a uniformed/civilian war-
time employment versus maintaining homelife distinction may result in a 
more negative interpretation of public reaction to women's labour force 
participation than is warranted. At the same time, it is clear that women's 
uniformed service was not accorded high priority as a means for women to 
contribute to the national war effort. 
Other items contained in the Elliott-Haynes and CIPO surveys of public 
opinion, which are not included in Pierson's or Park's analyses, reveal a more 
positive side of public opinion regarding women's wartime labour force 
participation both in and out of uniform. For example, Park argues that public 
opinion regarding women's labour force participation during WWII was 
"unable to reflect the wartime need for female labour in either the military or 
civilian sector"22 of the Canadian economy. Indeed, Park suggests that policy 
initiatives to secure a supply of female labour were taken despite a lack of 
public consensus/encouragement for such initiatives.23 This interpretation is 
not supported by the responses to public opinion polls conducted during 
WWII. 
20. Ibid., the rankings of these categories remained the same when Francophone 
responses were analyzed separately, although the proportions changed with 40 percent of 
French Canadians ranking "maintaining homelife" as the most important contribution women 
could make to the war effort. Eighteen percent cited war work in factories, while only 3 percent 
cited "joining women's forces". That a greater proportion of Francophone respondents than 
their Anglophone counterparts (20 percent) felt women's greatest contribution to the war effort 
lay in maintaining homelife may again reflect their more general resistance to Canada's wartime 
role as a whole. Already opposed to the loss of sons to conscripted overseas service, it is perhaps 
not surprising that they objected more strongly to the possible loss of female friends and 
relatives from the family circle. Indeed, announcement of the national compulsory registration 
of women, in August 1942, "aroused unfavourable comment in Quebec". Employment of 
Women and Day Care of Children (completed sometime before August 24, 1950), part I, 
"History of the Wartime Activities of the Department of Labour", Public Archives of Canada 
(PAC), RG 35, series F, vol. 20, file 10, p. 80. 
21. Ruth Roach Pierson, "They're Still Women ... ", p. 136. 
22. R.E. Park, "Public Opinion", p. 6. 
23. Ibid., p. 3. 
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Data regarding the extent to which women were needed in the armed 
forces and in war industry are particularly important in determining the degree 
to which public opinion reflected wartime "womanpower" requirements. 
Responses to an item contained in the Elliott-Haynes survey indicate wide-
spread public recognition of the need for women both in war industry and in 
the armed forces. Specifically, 84 percent of those surveyed felt that women 
were needed in war industry, while 66 percent of respondents recognized the 
need for women in the armed forces. 24 Francophone respondents were less 
likely, however, to view women's military service as essential for the success-
ful prosecution of the war. While 78 percent of Anglophone respondents 
recognized the need for women in the armed forces, only 40 r,ercent of French 
Canadians felt women were needed for uniformed service.2 Less recognition 
of the need for women in the armed forces among French Canadians was, no 
doubt, influenced by the fact that Francophone respondents were less likely to 
be aware of the existence of the women's services. When asked if they had 
even heard of the three divisions of the women's services, nearly all the 
Anglophones surveyed responded that they had. Ninety-nine percent had 
heard of the C.W.A.C. and R.C.A.F. (W.D.), while 98 percent recognized the 
W.R.C.N.S. by name. In contrast, only 77 percent of Francophone respondents 
had heard of the C.W.A.C.; 58 percent recognized the R.C.A.F. (W.D.) by 
name and less than half ( 41 percent) indicated that they had ever heard of the 
W.R.C.N.S.26 While less awareness regarding the existence of the women's 
services on the part of Francophones may have influenced their recognition of 
the need for women's uniformed service, French-speaking Canadians' relative 
failure to perceive a need for women in the armed forces also reflected their 
more general resistance to Canada's wartime role as a whole. 
This interpretation is consistent with responses to questions regarding 
women's reasons for joining the armed forces or taking jobs in war industries. 
Thus, while 65 percent of English Canadians cited patriotic factors underlying 
women's decisions to enroll in the women's services, only 36 percent of 
Francophone respondents attributed women's wartime uniformed service to 
such factors. 27 Forty percent of English Canadians compared to 24 percent of 
Francophones cited "DO THEIR BIT" as a factor underlying women's deci-
sions to enroll in the armed forces. Thirteen percent of Anglophones versus 9 
percent of Francophones indicated "Prestige (uniform)", while 12 percent of 
English-speaking respondents compared to only 3 percent of French-speaking 
respondents cited "Release manpower" as reasons why women joined the 
forces. 28 When asked why women took jobs in war industry, 57 percent of 
Anglophones versus 23 percent of Francophones cited patriotic factors. 
Thirty-nine percent of Anglophones compared to 19 percent of Francophones 
24. Elliott-Haynes, p. 10. 
25. Ibid., p. 11. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Elliott-Haynes, p. 17. 
28. Ibid. 
WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION: 1939-1946 341 
cited "DO THEIR BIT", while 18 percent of English-speaking Canadians 
versus 4 percent of French Canadians indicated "Release manpower".29 
Moreover, the apparently greater conservatism among French Canadians 
toward the employment of women in the newly expanding war industries was 
seen, in part, as a reaction to the perceived threat that the drift toward industrial 
centres posed to "the traditional culture of French Canada, centered in homes 
and villages."30 Thus, the Report on the Employment of Women attested to 
"the close-knit family unit revolving around the parish for its religious inspi-
ration, social activities and cultural life" as an "outstanding characteristic" of 
agrarian-based French-Canadian society.31 The lure of higher wages in war 
industries attracted many young Francophone women, "whose parents saw the 
advantage of allowing their children to work away from home temporarily",32 
from rural Quebec to the industrial centres of Montreal and Quebec City. 
Given the relatively poor pay conditions accorded service in the Women's 
Division of the armed forces, women's military service represented a decidely 
unattractive option. Finally, despite the apparent resistance among French 
Canadians to women's wartime industrial employment, the Report on the 
Employment of Women concluded: "It must not be assumed ... that Quebec 
women had not carried their share of work in essential services and war 
production, since the percentage of women at work and in war industries was 
proportionately as high as in the other areas. 33 
One factor which may have contributed to differences in the perceived 
need for women in the armed forces and war industries was the severe 
competition for female labour between these two segments of the wartime 
economy. Indeed, recognition of the severity of the competition for uniformed 
and civilian "woman power" had led some to advocate the conscription of 
Canadian women to better serve the war effort.34 
Although no legislation establishing a system of compulsory selective 
service for Canadian women was proposed, analysis of responses of a random 
sample of Canadians to a CIPO poll conducted in 1942 indicated popular 
support for government initiatives regarding the drafting of single women 
between 21 and 35 years of age for wartime (civilian) job training. The survey 
revealed that 54 percent of those surveyed favoured the implementation of a 
system of selective service for Canadian women. Thirty-eight percent of those 
surveyed were opposed to the conscription of women for war-work, while 
8 percent were undecided.35 
29. Ibid. 
30. "Employment of Women", p. 31. 
31. Ibid., p. 30. 
32. Ibid., p. 34. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Toronto Star, August 23, 1943, p. 6. 
35. Toronto Star, January 21, 1942, p. 3. 
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If one measure of public recognition of the need for increased female 
labour to meet Canada's wartime commitments was the support accorded a 
system of national selective service, another indication of widespread public 
support for the expansion of employment opportunities for women in the 
Canadian labour force was the endorsement of the principle of equal pay for 
working women. A survey of Canadian attitudes conducted in the fall of 1942 
by the CIPO revealed that 79 percent of the Canadians interviewed supported 
the principle of equal pay for women in industry.36 Sixteen percent were 
opposed to the principle of equal pay, while 5 percent were undecided. 37 
Canadians' endorsement of equal pay for women was largely based on the 
belief that women were just as capable as the men they had replaced and that 
they should receive the same pay as men for doing a similar job. 38 
If advocacy of equal-pay principles was to some extent motivated by 
egalitarian ideals, evidence suggests that support of such principles was also 
motivated by economic interest. Thus, for example, the "rate for the job" was 
largely advocated in an attempt to protect the economic interests of veterans 
in the post-war economy: "Women should not be permitted to lower the wage 
rates on jobs where they have replaced men, or in industries which formerly 
employed men only ... . Men leaving to go into the armed forces must be able 
to feel that women who carry on in their places are not being forced to 
undercut established wage standards."39 
The issue of the "wage rate" had particularly important implications for 
the recruitment of volunteers into the Women's Division of the armed forces. 
Thus, for example, it was suggested that the campaign to enrol 100,000 
volunteers in the Women's Division of the armed forces "will be considerabl~ 
aided when the conditions of pay for women in the services are improved." 
Indeed, a survey conducted in July and August of 1942 claimed that "the 
greatest deterrent to enlistment appears to be the smallness of the basic and 
trades pay given to C.W.A.C. volunteers.',4 1 Similarly, in response to a ques-
tion in the CWAC survey regarding the reasons why eligible civilian friends 
of servicewomen hesitated to enroll in the women's forces, the largest propor-
tion (27 percent) of respondents cited "poor pay and allowances" .42 As well, 
in the Elliott-Haynes Report, while 54 percent of Canadians cited "make good 
money" as the major reason for women taking jobs in war industry, this factor 
was not even mentioned as a motive underlying women's enrollment in the 
36. Toronto Star, February 19, 1943, p. 6. 
37. Ibid., p. 17. 
38. Ibid., p. 6. 
39. Toronto Star, January 6, 1945, p. 4. 
40. Toronto Star, January 5, 1943, p. 6. 
41. Memo of August 19, 1942, toA.G. fromLt.-Col.J.E. McKenna. PAC, RG24, Reel 
n° C-5301, file H.Q.S. 8984, quoted in Ruth Roach Pierson, "'Jill Canuck': CWAC of All 
Trades, But No 'Pistol Packing Momma'." Historical Papers/Communications historiques, 
1978, p. 109. 
42. CW AC Report, p. 26. 
WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION: 1939-1946 343 
anned forces.43 French Canadians were more likely (62 percent) than their 
Anglophone counterparts (51 percent) to cite "make good money" as women's 
primary motive for working in a war industry.44 In light of historical evidence 
which suggests that the primary motive of the majority of women entering the 
labour force during WWII was economic necessity, the attractiveness of 
uniformed service would have substantially diminished. Indeed, as the Elliott-
Haynes Report indicated, "increase pay" was the single most important factor 
cited by those surveyed to make enlistment in the anned forces more attractive 
to Canadian women.45 
On July 24, 1943, the wage rate paid to women in the armed forces was 
raised from two thirds to four fifths that of men in the Canadian Army, 
increasing servicewomen's basic daily pay from $0.90 to $1.05 with a $0.15 
per day increase at the end of six months service.46 The financial benefits 
accorded servicewomen at this time included trades pay, "according to their 
grouping on the same basis and at the same rates" as servicemen, and provi-
sion of dependent's (separation) allowance provided the servicewoman's total 
income, including the allowance, did not exceed $2,100 annually.47 The impact 
of the improved pay conditions and benefits for women in the anned forces on 
recruiting was evident.48 
Despite government attempts to improve pay conditions and benefits for 
women in the armed forces, the 16 percent increase introduced in the summer 
of 1943 did not appease public opinion which continued to advocate equaliza-
tion of pay rates for servicemen and women. The results of a CIPO poll 
conducted the following year indicated that despite the pay raise, the majority 
of the Canadian public did not consider the increase sufficient. Fifty-seven 
percent of those surveyed continued to advocate complete equalization of pay 
rates for servicemen and women. Thirty-four percent opposed equalization of 
pay rates for service personnel, while 9 percent were undecided.49 Several 
factors may account for the greater public endorsement of the principle of 
equal pay for women in industry, reflected in responses to the 1942 CIPO 
survey, than the support accorded equalization of pay rates for service person-
nel evident here. First, differences in public support for equal pay principles 
within the civilian and military sectors of the Canadian economy may reflect 
differential recognition of the need for womanpower in war-related industry 
and the armed forces. Second, greater support for the principle of equal pay 
43. Elliott-Haynes, p. 16. 
44. Ibid., p. 17. 
45. Ibid., p. 21. 
46. Toronto Star, July 24, 1943, p. 1; "Canadian Forces - Increases of Pay for 
Women's Services", July 24, 1943, Dominion of Canada Official Report of Debates: House of 
Commons, vol. V, 1943. Ottawa: The King's Printer, 1944, pp. 5,357-5,358. Also cited in 
Pierson, "Jill Canuck", p. 123. 
47. Ibid., p. 1; ibid., pp. 5357-5358; ibid., p. 123. 
48. Toronto Star, November 18, 1943, p. 25. 
49. Toronto Star, May 31, 1944, p. 20. 
344 HISTOIRE SOCIALE- SOCIAL HISTORY 
for working (civilian) women may reflect, in part, attempts to protect the 
economic interests of veterans in the post-war reconstruction economy. To the 
extent that protection of post-war economic interests was irrelevant to the 
issue of pay rates within the wartime military, responses to the 1944 CIPO 
survey may be a more accurate indicator of the extent to which advocacy of 
equal pay principles was motivated by egalitarian ideals. Third, less public 
support for equalization of pay rates for service men and women may reflect, 
in part, differential perceptions of wartime conditions of service for military 
personnel (e.g., risk of injury or loss oflife for combat (male) personnel) and, 
consequently, differential perceptions regarding equalization of pay rates. 
Finally, the discrepancy evident in public support for equal pay principles 
between 1942 and 1944 CIPO surveys may reflect, in part, the cyclical pattern 
of response to crisis, on the one hand, and economic exigencies, on the other, 
that characterized women's wartime labour force participation. 
Widespread support for conscription of women for essential war indus-
tries and endorsement of equal pay for civilian and uniformed women were 
indicative of Canadians' recognition of the wartime demands for 
"womanpower" necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. However, 
while wartime exigencies had necessitated the progressive recruitment of 
single, then childless married women for full-time employment and, fmally, 
the recruitment of mothers with home responsibilities for part-time employ-
ment to meet the increasing demands for female labour, 50 public pressure to 
restrict employment opportunities for women in the post-war economy 
mounted as the national crisis drew to an end. If the dilemma of the early war 
years had been to recruit sufficient numbers of women to "free men to fight", 
the dilemma in the latter stages of the war effort was how to persuade women 
to return to their homes to "free jobs for men".51 
The ideological and economic bases of public pressure to restrict 
women's participation in the post-war reconstruction of industry were evident. 
Not only did the employment of married women with home responsibilities 
have deleterious consequences for domestic relations and for the health and 
welfare of the nation's "child life", but women's continued employment 
constituted a serious threat to returning veterans in the post-war scramble for 
jobs. 
While recruitment propaganda for women throughout the war had em-
phasized patriotic duty and the necessity of sacrifice for the nation at war, it 
had become transparently obvious early in the war effort that the primary 
motivation of the majority of women entering the labour force was economic 
50. For an excellent review of federal government initiatives to recruit women into the 
labour force after 1942, see Ruth Roach Pierson, "Women's Emancipation and the Recruitment 
of Women into the Labour Force in World War II" in The Neglected Majority: Essays in 
Canadian Women's History, edited by Susan Mann Trofimenkoff and Alison Prentice. 
Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977, pp. 125-145. 
51. Toronto Star, March 6, 1945, p. 18. 
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necessity. The results of a survey of married applicants over 35 years of age, 
conducted in March 1943 by the Women's Division of the Toronto Employ-
ment and Selective Service Office, revealed that 59 percent of respondents 
cited "desire to supplement family income" as their primary objective in 
securing employment. Another 32 percent indicated "personal needs", while 
only 9 percent cited patriotic motives. 52 Results of a similar survey conducted 
by the Quebec Jeunesse Ouvriere Catholique (Jocistes) were reported in the 
May 1943 issue of Relations. The investigation disclosed that almost one third 
(31.4 percent) of the sample of 700 gainfully employed female members cited 
"economic necessity - no other source of revenue" as their reason for 
ki 53 wor ng. 
With the national crisis drawing to an end and the wartime demand for 
womanpower passed, the problem facing Canadian society became one of 
how to persuade female workers to relinquish their newly acquired economic 
and social independence. The problem was acute. If it was clear that the 
majority of women had secured employment for economic reasons, it was 
equally clear that the vast number of female workers were unwilling to 
relinquish their improved economic and social status. If Canadians, as a 
nation, assumed that women would "give back" men's jobs, working women 
did not share the majority opinion. A survey of women employed in Ontario 
war industries disclosed that more than 86 percent wished to continue working 
after the war. Eight-four percent of the married women surveyed wanted 
post-war employment: 95 percent of single workers, 100 percent of widows 
and 75 percent of female employees with spouses in the armed forces indi-
cated their desire to remain at work in the post-war reconstruction economy. 54 
The apparent determination of Canadian women not to relinquish the eco-
nomic and social gains made during the war is reflected in headlines such as 
"Girls Invade Man's World and Intend to Stay There"55 and "V-E Day Brings 
Boys Home But Girls Stick to Jobs."56 
Responses to a question in a 1943 CIPO poll regarding equal opportunity 
for women in the post-war era indicated that 72 percent of Canadians felt that 
men should be given the first chance for employment in the reconstruction 
economy. Twenty-four percent thought women should be given equal oppor-
tunity to compete with men for jobs in industry, while 4 percent were unde-
cided. 57 In 1945, an almost identical question elicited a similar response with 
69 percent of respondents favouring a "men first" policy in the post-war 
economy. Twenty percent of those surveyed thought women should have 
52. Letter of April 8, 1943, from B.J. Sullivan to Mrs. Rex Eaton. PAC, RG 27, vol. 
605, file n° 6-24-1, vol. 1. · 
53. Memo of May 11, 1943, from Percy A. Robert, Montreal, to Mrs. Rex Eaton and 
Mr. Goulet. PAC, RG 27, vol. 605, file n° 6-24-1, vol. 1. 
54. Toronto Star, July 4, 1944, p. 18. 
55. Toronto Star, November 1, 1944, p. 15. 
56. Toronto Star, May 19, 1945, p. 18. 
57. TorontoStar,April21, 1943,p.5. 
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equal opportunity with men, 8 percent responded with a "qualified" answer58 
and 3 percent were undecided.59 Although some quarters argued for the 
inclusion of female employees in plans for the post-war reconversion of 
industry,60 the majority of Canadians antic*ated working women's return to 
the home, whether voluntary or enforced. 1 As one government official re-
marked: " ... we'll have trouble with women after the war, but we'll just have 
to squeeze them out of jobs until they go back into their homes. ,,62 
Not surprisingly, with the national crisis drawing to a close and Canadian 
society faced with the task of "squeezing" women out of men's jobs, the tenor 
of newspaper reporting of women in men's jobs underwent a drastic transfor-
mation. Far from the reliable, efficient women who had donned the bandanas 
and smocks of industry in response to the national crisis, women war workers 
were coming to be viewed as a liability, no longer physically or mentally able 
to cope with the demands of production. The changing temper of the times was 
heralded in headlines such as "Women Can't Take It As Well As Men In War 
Work"63 and in articles which attested to lower female productivity.64 
Despite such arguments, no verifiable evidence of gender-differences in 
wartime industrial productivity is available. Moreover, the fact that employers 
were reluctant to lose a trained labour force65 and that substantial circumstan-
tial evidence exists which suggests that women war workers were at least as 
efficient as their male counterparts66 argues against the contention of lowered 
female productivity. That such arguments came into prominence during the 
later stages of the war is understandable in light of government initiatives 
which sought to facilitate the return of married women to the home and to 
channel single war workers out of "men's jobs" into traditionally female 
occupations: domestic service, nursing and teaching.67 
In summary, women's labour force participation during WWII (both to 
meet Canada's military and civil commitments) reflected a cyclical pattern of 
response to crisis on the one hand, and economic exigencies on the other. 
While efficient prosecution of the war had necessitated the recruitment of 
58. Among the qualified answers, according to the CIPO, "by far the most frequent was 
to the effect that the breadwinner of a family, regardless of sex, should get the first chance at a 
job." Toronto Star, October 17, 1945, p. 9. 
59. Toronto Star, October 17, 1945, p. 9. 
60. Such arguments represented both a response to women's raised socio-economic 
aspirations and economic motivations as well as recognition of the fact that employers would 
be loathe to lose a trained labour force. Toronto Star, January 26, 1945, p. 6. 
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62. Ibid., p. 6. 
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65. Toronto Star, January 26, 1945, p. 6. 
66. See, for example, Toronto Star, November 23, 1942, p. 6; March 9, 1944, p. 22; 
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67. For a discussion of post-war government policy, see Ruth Roach Pierson, 
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women into the armed forces and war industry, women's continued employ-
ment threatened to exacerbate the problem of post-war unemployment. 
IV-Conclusion 
During WWII, the majority of the Canadian civilian adult population 
recognized the wartime requirement for female labour both in the Women's 
Division of the armed forces and in war industries. The greater opposition 
among French-speaking Canadians toward women's uniformed service may 
have reflected French-speaking Canadians' opposition to the issue of 
conscription (of men) for overseas service, in particular; and a more general 
rejection of government defence policies and initiatives as a whole. Moreover, 
the apparently greater resistance among Francophones toward women's war-
related industrial employment may have reflected a perceived threat to the 
traditional cultural and social life of agrarian-based Quebec society posed by 
the expansion of war-related employment opportunities for women in the 
industrial centres of the province. The economic advantages associated with 
women's wartime industrial employment made their temporary absence from 
the rural community acceptable. Failure to place the analysis of French 
Canadians' response to women's wartime labour force participation within the 
broader economic and social historical context may result in a more negative 
interpretation of Francophone (and Anglophone) opinion regarding the war-
time participation of women both in and out of uniform. This is not to suggest 
that Canadians did not remain committed to traditional attitudes regarding 
women's femininity and proper sphere in society. What the historical evidence 
does demonstrate is that despite such traditional attitudes, Canadian public 
opinion was unequivocable in its recognition of wartime "womanpower" 
requirements and its support for initiatives to secure the supply of female 
labour necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. 
The analysis indicates widespread popular support for endorsement of 
initiatives designed to secure the necessary "womanpower" required to meet 
Canada's civil and military commitments in support of the national war effort. 
The results of CIPO polls conducted in 1942 and 1944 indicate that the 
majority of Canadians supported the implementation of a system of national 
selective service for Canadian women and the principle of equal pay for 
women in both the civilian and military sectors of the Canadian economy. As 
well, analysis of responses regarding the extent to which parents, husbands, 
boyfriends and brothers would approve of the entry of female friends and 
relatives into the armed forces and war-related industrial employment sug-
gests public approval of the employment of women both in and out of uniform. 
Moreover, if we exclude Francophone responses from the analysis of this item 
as it pertains to women's military service, the inescapable conclusion is that 
the majority of English-speaking Canadians (52 percent) approved of 
women's enlistment in the armed forces. Recognition of the existence of this 
substantial support has been long overdue. 
